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Abstract
Part I of this Comment analyzes Community State aid policy and the standing issues facing
individuals who seek judicial review of Community measures regarding State aids. Part II examines the rationale of the Court in rendering the COFAZ judgment. Part III explores the practical
effect of COFAZ on individuals challenging State aids decisions and on Community State aids
policy.

COMMENT
THE NEW STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY IN
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STATE AIDS
ACTIONS AFTER COFAZ
INTRODUCTION
In Compagnie Franqaisede 1'Azote (COFAZ) S.A. v. Commission,'
the Court of Justice of the European Communities (Court)
held for the first time that business enterprises in one Member
State who are affected by State aid granted to competitors in
another Member State have standing to seek judicial review of
a Commission decision allowing the aid, even though the decision has been addressed to the competitor's national govern2
ment. The Court thereby expanded the scope of admissibility
under Article 173(2) of the Treaty of Rome3 (Treaty) to permit
a private plaintiff cause of action to a new class of applicants.
COFAZ indicates that the Court is willing to consider a broad
range of factors when determining the admissibility of individual complaints concerning Community measures. 4
This Comment argues that the Court has developed a new
test to determine standing that is based on the applicants' conduct, the existence of procedural guarantees, and significant
effect on economic interests. Part I analyzes Community State
1. Case 169/84, 1986 E.C.R. -,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,284.
2. The issue of admissibility determines whether the Court is competent to hear
a case. Three factors comprise the determination: subject matter jurisdiction; applicant's locus standi (standing to sue); and timeliness of the proceedings. See T.C.
HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 39 (1981).

In COFAZ

only the applicant's locus standi was at issue. See id. at - (para. 21 of the judgment),
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,284, at 16,762.
3. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, Cr.
Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) 57 (official English transl.), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 75-76
(1958) (unofficial English transl.), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4635 [hereinafter EEC
Treaty]. Article 173(2) states that "[a]ny natural or legal person may . . . institute
proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which,
although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of
direct and individual concern to the former." Id., 298 U.N.T.S. at 75-76, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4635.
4. Community measures having legal effect may be in the form of regulations,
directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions. See 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG,
THE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 5-572-73 (1986).

For the pur-

poses of this Comment, Community measures refer to regulations and decisions issued by the Commission and Council.
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aid policy and the standing issues facing individuals who seek
judicial review of Community measures regarding State aids.
Part II examines the rationale of the Court in rendering the
COFAZ judgment. Part III explores the practical effect of
COFAZ on individuals challenging State aids decisions and on
Community State aids policy. This Comment concludes that
the more liberal approach to admissibility adopted by the
Court in COFAZ is an appropriate step toward the acknowledgment of individual rights under the Treaty as well as a means
of protecting individual interests and furthering the economic
goals of the Community.
I. STATE AIDS POLICY AND INDIVIDUAL ADMISSIBILITY
One of the main objectives of the European Community is
economic integration by means of the development of a common market free of internal barriers to trade.5 To this end,
Article 92(1)6 of the Treaty prohibits any State aid 7 that dis5. See, e.g., Single European Act, E.C. Bull. No. 2 (Supp.), at 11 (1986). One of
the goals of the Act, the purpose of which is to advance the Member States toward a
European Union, is to establish by the end of 1992 an internal market completely
free of barriers to the movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. See
Glaesner, The Single European Act: Attempt at an Appraisal, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 446
(1987) (analysis of the provisions of the Single European Act). This goal may come
into direct conflict with national economic policies pursued by Member States. See P.
MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 189-90 (4th ed. 1985). Since the
outset of the European recession, triggered by the oil crisis of the 1970s, Member
States have been under pressure to improve their economic performance by intervening in the operation of their economies. The States have increased assistance to
industry for modernization of plant, rationalization of operations, and reduction of
unemployment. See 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 4, at 92.07; Comm'n, Eleventh Report on Competition Policy
175 (1981).
6. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 92(1), at 35, 298 U.N.T.S. at 51, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2921. Article 92(1) provides:
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.
Id., 298 U.N.T.S. at 51, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2921. This Comment discusses
only the aid provisions of the Treaty of Rome. For a discussion of the European Coal
and Steel Community rules, see Caspari, State Aids in the EEC, in 1983 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 1, 12-16 (B. Hawk ed. 1984).
7. State aid may be described as all government-sourced assistance to undertakings or activities that benefit their competitive position in one Member State vis-a-vis
other undertakings or activities taking place in other Member States of the European
Community. Aid may take any form and may benefit the undertakings in any man-
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8
torts competition or affects trade between Member States.
Such State aids undermine the establishment of the internal
market, 9 and are thus considered incompatible with the Common Market and subject to alteration or eradication.' 0

A. Community Policy
While the Treaty subjects the grant of State aids to strict
Community supervision," l not all State aids are precluded. Indeed, the Treaty provides for numerous exceptions to the general prohibition, 1 2 by virtue of which State aids may be authorner. Among the possibilities are financial contributions to capital equipment or interest costs, reductions or refunds for taxes or social security payments, reduced utility rates, supply of free land or buildings, free research or promotional assistance,
and exemption from anti-pollution regulations. See 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra
note 4, at 92.03.
8. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 92(1), at 35, 298 U.N.T.S. at 51, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
2921. The effects of State aids manifest themselves in various
ways: the effects may be immediate, such as in the case of import restrictions; indirect, as in the grant of export incentives; or oblique, for example, where aid given to
one industry in fact benefits another industry whose output is utilized by the first. See
3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 4, at 92.06; Comm'n, Fourth Report on Competition Policy 7 163-65 (1975).
9. See Caspari, supra note 6, at 3-4; see also Comm'n, Eleventh Report on Competition Policy
176 (1981).
10. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 93(2), at 36, 298 U.N.T.S. at 52, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2931. Article 93(2) provides: "[i]f... the Commission finds that
aid granted by a State or through State resources is not compatible with the common
market having regard to Article 92, or that such aid is being misused, it shall decide
that the State concerned shall abolish or alter such aid ..
" Id., 298 U.N.T.S. at 52,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2931.
11. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 93(1), at 36, 298 U.N.T.S at 52, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
2931. Article 93(1) provides that "[tihe Commission shall, in
cooperation with the Member States, keep under constant review all systems of aid
existing in those States. It shall propose to the latter any appropriate measures required by the progressive development or by the functioning of the common market." Id., 298 U.N.T.S. at 52, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2931. The Commission of
the European Communities is the Community institution with primary responsibility
for evaluating State aids and enforcing the Treaty provisions. See T.C. HARTLEY,
supra note 2, at 8-11.
12. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 92(2), at 35, 298 U.N.T.S. at 51, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
2921. Article 92(2) considers per se compatible certain aids
which are justified on social or public welfare grounds, aids to rectify damage caused
by natural disasters, and aid for economic compensation to certain sectors of the
Federal Republic of Germany bordering on East Germany and Czechoslovakia. See
id., 298 U.N.T.S. at 51, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2921. Article 92(3) allows for
derogation from Article 92(1) where, in the discretion of the Commission or Council,
exceptions to the general rule are warranted. See id. at 36, 298 U.N.T.S. at 51,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2921. Aids which may be considered compatible with the
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ized'3 by the Community and so enable the Member States to
implement national industrial policy.'"
Member States must notify the Commission of all new or
altered aid schemes.' 5 If in the Commission's judgment the
proposed aid may be incompatible with the Common Market,
the Commission will investigate the aid by using the procedure
set forth in Article 93(2).6 To evaluate the aid properly, the

Commission is required' 7 to allow all "parties concerned" to
submit their observations on the proposed aid.' 8 Once the
Commission has heard from all such parties, it may render its
final decision on the compatibility of the aid scheme."
Common Market under Article 92(3) generally fall into three categories: sectoral
aids, regional aids and general aids. See A. PARRY & J. DINNAGE, PARRY & HARDY:
EEC LAw 347-49 (2d ed. 1981); FitzGerald, EEC Law Relating to State Aids: Articles 92
to 94 EEC Treaty, in DOING BUSINESS IN IRELAND app. 2-2, at App. 2-2-6-13 (P. Ussher,
B. O'Connor, C. McCarthy eds. 1987).
13. The Commission may use its discretionary power to allow certain aids in
derogation from Article 92(1). It will do so with the proviso that there be some compensatory justification, taking the form of a contribution to the aims of the Common
Market by the recipient of the aid, which would not otherwise be produced by the
operation of normal market forces. See Comm'n, Tenth Report on Competition Policy 213 (1980).
14. To this end, Member States may design their aid schemes to fall within the
derogations from Article 92(1) provided for in Article 92(2) & (3). See, e.g., Hogan,
Competition Law of EEC Origin, in DOING BUSINESS IN IRELAND 15.03[7][b] (P. Ussher,
B. O'Connor & C. McCarthy eds. 1987) (pointing to the possibility that certain of
Ireland's state-sponsored aid and assistance programs may not qualify for any of the
derogations from Article 92(1) and, therefore, may be considered incompatible).
15. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 93(3), at 36, 298 U.N.T.S. at 52, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2931. Article 93(3) provides that "[t]he Commission shall be
informed ... of any plans to grant or alter aid." Id., 298 U.N.T.S. at 52, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2931.
16. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 93(2), at 36, 298 U.N.T.S. at 52, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2931. Article 93(2) provides, in pertinent part:
If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their comments,
the Commission finds that aid granted ... is not compatible with the common market having regard to Article 92, or that such aid is being misused, it
shall decide that the State concerned shall abolish or alter such aid within a
period of time to be determined by the Commission.
Id., 298 U.N.T.S. at 52, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2931.
17. See id., 298 U.N.T.S. at 52, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2931.
18. See id., 298 U.N.T.S. at 52, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2931. Concerned
parties include all States, individuals, and enterprises affected by the aid. See Federal
Republic of Germany v. Commission, Case 84/82, 1984 E.C.R. 1451, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,090 (Commission decision on the compatibility of a Belgian textile
aid scheme struck down on the ground that complainant had not been afforded an
opportunity to be heard during the Commission's investigation of the scheme).
19. The Commission is not required, however, to take a formal decision. See 3
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The Commission may also investigate an unnotified State
aid that comes to its attention. 20

In COFAZ, the complain-

ants, 2 French manufacturers of nitrate fertilizers, claimed that

a preferential tariff2 2 for natural gas supplied to their Dutch
competitors by the Dutch gas board (Gasunie) constituted an
incompatible aid. 23 The Dutch government had not notified
the Commission of the tariff. However, based on COFAZ's
complaint, the Commission opened an Article 93(2) procedure
to evaluate the tariff's compatibility. During the course of the
24
Article 93(2) investigation, Gasunie amended its tariff system
and so notified the Commission. In light of the new tariff sysH. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 4, at 93.07. In COFAZ, for example, the Commission found that the Netherlands government had failed to fulfill its obligation to notify under Article 93(3), but declined to rule at that time on the compatibility of the
aid. See Compagnie Fran~aise de 'Azote (COFAZ) S.A. v. Commission, Case 169/84,
1986 E.C.R. - (para. 6 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,284, at
16,760.
20. Additionally, the Commission may open Article 169 proceedings to enjoin
payment of unnotified aid pursuant to the Member State's failure to notify. See EEC
Treaty, supra note 3, art. 93(2), at 36, 298 U.N.T.S. at 52, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
2931. See also Gilmour, The Enforcement of Community Law by the Commission in the Context
of State Aids: The Relationship between Articles 93 and 169 and the Choice of Remedies, 18
COMM. MKT. L. REV. 63, 74 (1981).
21. The complainants joining COFAZ were Soci6t CdF Chimie Azote et Fertilisants S.A. and Soci6t6 Chimique de la Grande Paroisse S.A. The complaint was
submitted on behalf of COFAZ et al. by the Syndicat Professionel de l'Industrie des
Engrais Azot6s (Trade Association of Producers of Nitrate Fertilizers).
22. The tariff (tariff E) consisted of a two-tier structure that reduced the cost of
natural gas used as a feed stock for the production of ammonia. COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R.
at - (para. 4 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt Rep. (CCH)
14,284, at 16,760.
23. COFAZ claimed that the annual savings transferred to the three Dutch producers of nitrate fertilizers by the tariff system amounted to approximately Hfl 165
million. In addition, COFAZ stated that natural gas represents approximately 80
percent of the ex-works cost of producing ammonia, the raw material from which
nitrate fertilizers are manufactured. Finally, COFAZ submitted evidence that between 1978 and 1982 its Dutch competitors had tripled their volume of exports to
France and had increased their share of the French market between 1980 and 1982 to
21.7 percent from 9 percent. COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at - (para. 27 of the judgment),
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,284, at 16,763.
24. The new tariff was intended to benefit major industrial users of natural gas
without discrimination among industrial sectors. The tariff required that users accept the following terms: minimum annual consumption of 600 million cubic meters
of gas; plant in operation at least 90 percent of the time; acceptance of total or
partial interruptions of service; and supplies of gas having varying calorific values.
COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at - (para. 10 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,284, at 16,761.
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tem, the Commission terminated its Article 93(2) procedure. 25
COFAZ subsequently lodged an application for annulment of
the Commission decision, claiming that the Commission had
committed errors in the assessment of material facts regarding
the tariff system and that the new tariff was "merely an attempt
to maintain in a different guise the previous tariff system." '26
B. Admissibility of Individuals' Complaints
The Treaty expressly grants Member States challenging
Community measures access to the Court ofJustice. 27 Consequently, national governments may bring actions against Commission decisions that either allow or deny the grant of aid. 28
Individuals, on the other hand, have far more tenuous rights to
Community judicial review.
To challenge a Community measure, an individual must
show that the measure is of "direct and individual concern" to
him.29 In COFAZ, the decision terminating the Article 93(2)
25. The Court's account of the Commission's conclusions regarding the compatibility of the new tariff read as follows:
The New tariff, tariff F, formed an integral part of the general tariff structure
for users in the Netherlands and did not discriminate between sectors. The
value of the rebate granted to the undertakings eligible for the new tariff
(by comparison with Tariff E) was even lower than the total value of the
savings made by Gasunie on account of the volume of consumption by those
undertakings and the other aforementioned conditions of the new tariff system.
Id., Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,284, at 16,761.
26. Id. at - (para. 12 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,284, at
16,761.
27. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 173(1), at 57, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4635. Article 173(1) provides:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council and the
Commission other than recommendations or opinions. It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the Council or
the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty, or of any rule
of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.
Id., 298 U.N.T.S. at 75, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4635. The Council, Commission,
and Member States are so-called "privileged" applicants whose standing before the
Court of Justice is never in question. See T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 2, at 351-52.
28. See, e.g., Federal Republic of Germany v. Commission, Case 84/82, 1984
E.C.R. 1451, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,090 (action brought by Germany to annul a Commission decision authorizing Belgium to implement a plan to restructure
its textile and clothing industry).
29. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 173(2), at 57, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75-76,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4635.
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procedure was addressed not to COFAZ, but to the Dutch government. As a non-addressee of the decision, COFAZ sought
annulment of the decision under Article 173(2) as a person directly and individually concerned.30
While the language of Article 173(2) does not admit of an
exclusionary purpose toward individual applicants, from the
beginning, the Court chose to take a narrow reading of the
provision.3 The Court established the definition of a person
individually concerned in Plaumann & Co. v. Commission.32 The
Court found that for a decision to be contested, it must affect
non-addressees "by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them ' 3 3 or whose circumstances set them apart from
the general public.3 4 The individual must, by virtue of these
attributes, be affected by the decision in a manner similar to
that of the addressee. 35 The Court concluded that, to be individually concerned, the applicant must be affected by the decision in a manner different from that of the general class of individuals of which he is a member.3 6
The test for direct concern, developed in Toepfer v. Commission,3 7 centers on whether the contested decision comes into
30. See COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at - (para. 1 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,284, at 16,760. It has been established, however, that potential individual recipients of State aids have standing. See, e.g., Philip Morris Holland BV v. Commission, Case 730/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2671, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8695 (no challenge to the admissibility of an application by the complainant cigarette manufacturer
who was the intended recipient of general investment aid from Dutch government).
31. See Dinnage, Locus Standi and Article 173 EEC: The Effect of Metro SB Grossmarkte v. Commission, 4 EUR. L. REV. 15, 18-30 (1979).
32. Case 25/62, 1963 E.C.R. 95, 1964 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 29. Plaumann concerned a suit brought by a German importer of fresh clementines who sought annulment of a Commission decision denying a request of the German government to
reduce the customs duty applicable to his goods. In holding that the application was
not admissible, the Court reasoned that the decision was not of individual concern to
the applicants because they were simply members of a class of importers of clementines. Id. at 107, 1964 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 47.
33. Id., 1964 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 47.
34. Id., 1964 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 47.
35. Id., 1964 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 47.
36. Id., 1964 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 47.
37. Toepfer & Getreide-Import Gesellschaft v. Commission, Joined Cases 106 &
107/63, 1965 E.C.R. 405, 1966 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 111. Toepfer concerned applications by German importers of cereal grains for annulment of a Commission decision
authorizing the German government's suspension of import licenses and maintenance of protective measures against the importation of maize. The decision was
found to be of direct concern to the applicants because its effect was retroactive, and
so immediately deprived them of an existing legal right to obtain import licenses. Id.
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force immediately."' Under this test, if the addressee of the
decision has any discretion in its implementation, the decision
cannot be of direct concern to the non-addressee. 39 That is to
say, if the addressee may choose the manner in which the decision is to be effectuated or, more importantly, whether or not
it will be utilized, then the non-addressee's claim that the decision may deprive him of existing legal rights is tenuous.40
Under the restrictive interpretation of the standing provisions of Article 173(2) pronounced in Plaumann and Toepfer, the
Court dismissed nearly every complaint brought by non-addressees of decisions. 4 The Court's jurisprudence in this area
has undergone some change, however. Beginning with its
Metro 142 judgment and culminating with COFAZ, the Court has
found admissible a handful of non-addressee applications.4 3
These judgments suggest that the Court has developed standards and reasoning reflecting concerns different from those
enunciated in Plaumann and Toepfer.
II. THE COFAZ JUDGMENT
In finding that COFAZ was individually concerned, the
Court found persuasive three factors: the applicant's role in
the initiation of the procedure that culminated in the contested
decision; the existence of a procedural guarantee that confers
rights upon individuals; and the effect of the Commission deat 411, 1966 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 141; see also 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 4, at
5-391-92.
38. Toepfer, 1965 E.C.R. at 411, 1966 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 142.
39. See T.C. HARTLEY, supra note 2, at 373.
40. See, e.g., Societ "Eridania" Zuccherifici Nazionali v. Commission, Joined
Cases 10 & 18/68, 1969 E.C.R. 459, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8099. Applicant
sugar manufacturers sought annulment of Commission decisions authorizing the
grant of aid from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund to certain
sugar refineries in Italy. The decisions allowed the Italian government discretion in
the grant of part of the aid, while the balance was distributed uniformly by the Fund
to Italian sugar undertakings. Italy established certain criteria for the distribution of
its portion of the aid which effectively excluded the applicants. The Court held that
the Commission decisions had no influence on the discretionary grants and that the
applicants therefore were not directly concerned by the decisions. Id. at 482, paras.
12-14, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8099, at 8426.
41. See 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 4, at 173.18.
42. Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co K.G. v. Commission (Metro I), Case
26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435.
43. See infra notes 44-58 and accompanying text.
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cision on the applicant's market position. These elements will
be considered in turn.
A. Role Played by Applicant
In assessing the role played by COFAZ in theArticle 93(2)
procedure examining the Dutch tariff system, the Court relied
on its judgment in Timex v. Council & Commission.4 4 Timex arose
out of a complaint by the leading Community manufacturer of
mechanical watches and watch movements against a Council
regulation imposing an antidumping duty4 5 on imports of
mechanical wristwatches from the Soviet Union. In determining that Timex's application was admissible, the Court found
dispositive the fact that Timex, by reason of its initial complaint, instigated the investigation procedure, that its views
were heard during the procedure, and that "the conduct of the
investigation procedure was largely determined by Timex's ob"146
servations....
By bringing the complaint that led to the initiation of the
Article 93(2) procedure and by frequently submitting its observations and opinions to the Commission during the course of
the examination of the tariff, COFAZ played a very similar role
to that assumed by the complainant in Timex. 4 7 Citing as persuasive the findings in Timex concerning the applicant's involvement in the antidumping procedure, the Court held that
"[t]he same conclusions [as in Timex] apply to undertakings
which have played a comparable role in the procedure referred
44. Timex Corp. v. Council & Commission, Case 264/82, 1985 E.C.R. Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,143.
45. Antidumping duties are levied on imports to the Community which are de-

termined to have been sold at an export price that is lower than the normal value of
the same or similar products on their domestic or similar markets and which cause or
threaten to cause injury to Community industry. See C. STANBROOK, DUMPING 14-15,
49-51 (1980).
46. Timex, 1985 E.C.R. at - (para. 15 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,143, at 15,782.
47. In addition to its role of instigating the Commission decision by submitting
the original complaint, COFAZ's actions included the following: on Jan. 6, 1984,
COFAZ made further representations to the Commission as well as affirming its original complaint; on Mar. 28, 1984, COFAZ made further representations and raised
objections to the amended tariff system; on May 22, 1984, COFAZ notified the Commission of its objections to the decision to terminate the Article 93(2) procedure. See
COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at - (paras. 5, 7, 11 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,284, at 16,760-61.
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to in Article 93 ....
B. ProceduralGuarantees

The Article 93(2) procedure for evaluation of the compatibility of State aids requires that the Commission notify all
"parties concerned.

'4 9

Notification ensures that those con-

cerned by an aid have an opportunity to make their views
known to the Commission.50 An alleged violation by the Commission of such procedural rights of individuals is one of the
means by which persons may bring actions for annulment of
Commission decisions. 5
In holding that COFAZ possessed procedural rights under
Article 93(2) which were capable of protection, the Court relied primarily on its judgment in Metro J.52 Metro lodged a
complaint with the Commission pursuant to Regulation 17.11
Article 3 of Regulation 17 entitles a person who claims a legitimate interest in the finding of an infringement of Article 85 or
86 to make an application to the Commission alleging such an
infringement. 54 Basing its reasoning on this procedural right,
the Court held that applicants whose requests have been dismissed by the Commission have a right to seek judicial review
48. See id. at- (para. 25 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,284, at
16,763.
49. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
52. Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co. K.G. v. Commission (Metro I), Case
26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435. The complainant in
Metro I was a self-service wholesaler who wished to carry the products of SABA, a
manufacturer of electronic audio equipment. To maintain certain conditions of sale
of its products, SABA relied on a uniform distribution system for its Community
distributors. SABA refused to grant Metro a distributorship because Metro did not
fulfill the conditions in SABA's distribution agreement. Metro complained that the
system of distribution agreements infringed Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.
53. Council Regulation No. 17,J.O. 13/204 (1962), O.J. 1959-62 (English Special Ed.) p. 87, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2401.
54. Article 3 of Regulation No. 17 reads, in pertinent part:
(1) Where the Commission, upon application or upon its own initiative,
finds that there is infringement of Article 85 or 86 of the Treaty, it may by
decision require the undertakings concerned or associations of undertakings
concerned to bring such infringement to an end.
(2) Those entitled to make application are:
(b) natural or legal persons who claim a legitimate interest.
Id. at 205, O.J. 1959-62 at 88, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2401, at 1731.
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in order to protect their interests.5 5 Metro I was the first case to
hold that admissibility may be predicated, in part, on a Community regulation that provides a procedural right to claim infringement of the Treaty.
The COFAZ Court also cited FEDIOL v. Commission 56 and
Demo-Studio Schmidt v. Commission,5 7 which followed Metro I by
holding that secondary legislation 5 s may afford individuals a
basis for judicial review. In Metro I, FEDIOL, and Schmidt, applications for annulment were held admissible based on the
existence of regulations granting procedural rights. However,
because the Council has not yet promulgated any regulations
under Article 94,59 in COFAZ the Court looked to the right of
55. The Court stated:
It is in the interests of a satisfactory administration of justice and of the
proper application of Articles 85 and 86 that natural or legal persons who
are entitled, pursuant to Article 3(2)(b) of Regulation No. 17, to request the
Commission to find an infringement of Articles 85 and 86 should be able, if
their request is dismissed either wholly or in part, to institute proceedings in
order to protect their legitimate interests.
Metro I, 1977 E.C.R. at 1901, para. 13, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 7848.
56. EEC Seed Crushers' & Oil Processors' Federation (FEDIOL) v. Commission,
14,013. FEDIOL inCase 191/82, 1983 E.C.R. 2913, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
volved an application by a Community trade association for the annulment of the
Commission's refusal to initiate an anti-subsidy proceeding in respect of imports of
soya bean oil cake from Brazil. The Court relied on provisions of the antidumping
regulation (at that time, Council Regulation No. 3017, OJ. L 339/1 (1979)) which
allow any person acting on behalf of a Community industry that considers itself injured or threatened by injury by subsidized imports to lodge a complaint with the
Commission. The Court held that because "the regulation acknowledges that undertakings . . . injured by subsidization practices . . . have a legitimate interest in the
initiation of protective action by the Community ... it must therefore be acknowledged that they have a right of action within the framework of the legal status which
the regulation confers on them." FEDIOL, 1983 E.C.R. at 2936, para. 31, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,013, at 14,173.
57. Case 210/81, 1983 E.C.R. 3045, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,009. Schmidt
follows very closely both the facts and holding of Metro 1 (1977 E.C.R. 1875, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435). The Schmidt judgment reinforces the right of persons accorded procedural guarantees to seek review of decisions affecting their legitimate
14,009, at
interests. Schmidt, 1983 E.C.R. at 3063, para. 14, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
14,118-19.
58. Primary legislation consists of the European Community Treaties and Annexes thereto; secondary legislation, for the purposes of Article 173, consists of regulations, directives, and decisions. See 5 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 4, at
173.05.
59. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 94, at 36, 298 U.N.T.S. at 52, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2961. Article 94 provides that the Council may "make any appropriate
Id., 298 U.N.T.S. at 52,
regulations for the application of Articles 92 and 93 ....
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2961. For a discussion of the factors to be considered
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"parties concerned" to submit their comments during an Article 93(2) procedure. The Court noted that "Article 93(2) recognizes in general terms that the undertakings concerned are
entitled to submit their comments to the Commission but does
not provide any further details." 6 The Court reasoned that
the provisions of Article 93(2) were sufficiently analogous to
the regulations in Metro I and FEDIOL to conclude that they
produce procedural rights within the meaning of Article
6
173( 1).1
C. Effect on Market Position
The COFAZ Court expanded the criteria for proof of individual concern with its requirement that the applicants' market
position be significantly affected by the aid complained of.6 2 In

Timex, the Court noted that the complainant was the largest
Community manufacturer of mechanical watches and that the
antidumping duty complained of was fixed by taking account
of the extent of injury caused to Timex by the dumped imports.63 In comparison, in COFAZ there is no indication that
the Commission, in its evaluation of the tariff, took account of
COFAZ's specific situation. Nonetheless, the Court relied substantially on evidence supplied by COFAZ indicating that the
preferential tariff had significant economic effects, including a
tripling of the volume of imports to France by the Dutch manufacturers, whose market share increased sharply during the period preceding the filing of COFAZ's complaint. 64 This eviwhere an individual challenges a regulation, rather than a decision (as in COFAZ) see
Greaves, Locus Standi under Article 173 EEC when Seeking Annulment of a Regulation, 11
EUR. L. REV. 119 (1986).

60. COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at - (para. 25 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,284, at 16,763.
61. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. The second paragraph of Article
173 provides that natural or legal persons may challenge Community acts on the
same grounds as may privileged applicants under the first paragraph. See EEC
Treaty, supra note 3, art. 173(2), at 57, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75-76, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 4635.
62. The Court held that COFAZ could prove its complaint admissible if COFAZ
could show, inter alia, that its "position on the market is significantly affected by the
aid which is the subject of the contested decision." COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at - (para.
25 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,284, at 16,763.
63. See Timex Corp. v. Council & Commission, Case 264/82, 1985 E.C.R. (para. 15 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,143, at 15,782.
64. See COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at - (para. 27 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) T 14,284, at 16,763; see also supra note 22.
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dence proved sufficient for the Court to question whether, as
COFAZ claimed, the Commission had committed errors in its
assessment of the Dutch tariff system.6 5
III. THE EFFECTS OF COFAZ ON COMMUNITY
LA WAND POLICY
By expanding the scope of Article 173(2) standing to include State aids complainants, the Court has recognized that
individuals should be able to protect their interests under
Community law. The Court has done so, moreover, in a manner that does not threaten to undermine the functioning of the
State aids provisions as set out in the Treaty. Finally, the
COFAZ judgment represents an example of the Community's
commitment to fair competition and the establishment of the
Common Market.
A. Judicial Review for Protection of Rights and Economic Interests
The Court's decision in COFAZ recognizes the effects on
individuals of Community acts concerning State aids and of individuals' stakes in the outcome of such acts. The three factors6 6 determined to resolve the standing issue in COFAZ serve
as guideposts to the policies the Court wishes to further with
regard to individual citizens of the Community.
The first factor stated in COFAZ is the existence of the
procedural framework of Article 93(2) granting individuals the
right to be heard by Community institutions. By interpreting
the procedural guarantee 6 7 afforded by Community legislation
as satisfying the admissibility requirements of Article 173, the
Court reinforced the ability of individuals to obtain judicial review. After COFAZ, persons seeking to protect their legitimate
interests from incompatible State aids can rely on such legislation rather than on interpretations of the meaning of direct
and individual concern such as those established in Plaumann
See COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at - (para. 12 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep.
14,284, at 16,761.
See supra notes 44-65 and accompanying text.
See Slynn, EEC Competition Law from the Perspective of the Court ofJustice, in 1985
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 383, 386 (B. Hawk ed. 1986) (the Court is responsible for
ensuring that the Commission fulfills its obligations both under Community legislation and with regard to procedural guarantees granted to individuals).
65.
(CCH)
66.
67.
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and Toepfer.68 The Court in COFAZ acknowledged the economic concerns of individuals and the need for them to "institute proceedings in order to protect their legitimate interests."69
In COFAZ, the complainants had an express guarantee to
be heard by the Commission under Article 93(2).7o However,
COFAZ did not claim that its procedural rights had been infringed. Rather, it appealed from the Court's discretionary
judgment in finding the tariff compatible. 71 While it recognized that the existence of procedural rights could provide access to judicial review to COFAZ, the Court questioned not the
Commission's adherence to the procedural guidelines, but its
evaluation of the tariff.72 Thus, COFAZ allowed individuals the

right to judicial review of Community acts of discretion concerning State aids. The Court's apparent interest in the economic well-being of a Community industry73 demonstrates its
68. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
69. COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at - (para. 23 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,284, at 16,763 (quoting Metro SB-Grossmirkte GmbH & Co. K.G. v.
Commission (Metro I), Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, at 1888, para. 13, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 1901). The Court further held that "[i]t is sufficient to
note that the applicants have adduced pertinent reasons to show that the Commission's decision may adversely affect their legitimate interests by seriously jeopardizing their position on the market in question." COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at - (para. 28 of
the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,284, at 16,763. But cf Lord Bethell v.
Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 2277, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8858 (applicant, a user
of airlines and a leading member of an organization of users of air passenger services, found not to have a direct interest in an investigation by the Commission of
alleged price fixing of air fares among Community air carriers, and so not in the
necessary legal position to bring an action for annulment of a Commission communication declining to open such an investigation).
70. COFAZ was, in fact, involved at every stage of the procedure and concurrently made its views known. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
71. See COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at - (para. 12 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,284, at 16,761.
72. See id. at - (paras. 24-29 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,284, at 16,763. See also EEC Seed Crushers' & Oil Processors' Federation
(FEDIOL) v. Commission, Case 191/82, 1983 E.C.R. 2913, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,013. The Court enumerated the theories under which a complainant could seek
annulment of an antidumping decision. The Court held that complainants had a
right to judicial review of "whether the Commission has observed the procedural
guarantees granted ... whether or not it has committed manifest errors in its assessment of the facts, has omitted to take into consideration any essential matters ... or
has based the reasons for its decision on considerations amounting to a misuse of
powers." Id. at 2935, para. 30, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,013, at 14,173.
73. But cf. Slynn, supra note 67, at 393-94 (suggesting that, in the context of
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commitment to upholding Community competition policy,74 in
which State aids play an important role.
The second factor determinitive of standing-that the applicants be at the origin of the Commission's investigation of
the aid, which culminates in the contested decision-has a twofold effect. First, it prevents intervenors from gaining standing
merely by joining an ongoing investigation procedure once
they receive notice from the Commission that the procedure is
in progress. Additionally, this test ensures that only worthy
applications come before the Court. The merit of the complaint determines whether the Commission will open an Article 93(2) procedure.7 5 Therefore, if the Commission deems
the complaint to be groundless there will be no decision from
which the applicant may appeal.
The other, and perhaps unintended, effect of the participation requirement is to encourage business enterprises to
play a more activist role in protecting their competitive positions and economic stakes. This could result in increased vigilance as to the grant of unnotified or improperly modified aids
and to an increased number of complaints filed by individuals.
Such supplementary policing of State aids would assist the
Commission, which is already overburdened in its enforcement
effort.76
The final factor is the requirement that the aid which is the
subject of the contested decision significantly affect the market
position of the applicant.7 7 This test serves as a safeguard
against frivolous actions by requiring a showing of a substanArticles 85 and 86, the Court is concerned primarily with Community aims rather
than the protection of enterprises or consumers).
74. For a discussion of the EEC rules of competition applicable to Member
States, see Pescatore, Public and PrivateAspects of Community Competition Law, 10 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 373, 375-80 (1987) (arguing that the competition rules applicable to
public operators are based on the same principles as those applicable to private undertakings, and so there exists a system of Community competition regulation common to both).
75. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
76. The Commission has admitted the difficulty of policing State aids because of
both the number and complexity of aids granted. See Comm'n, Eleventh Report on
Competition Policy 176 (1981).
77. This express recognition of the potential for injury to the applicant is in
contrast to the Plaumannjudgment, where injury was not a consideration. See supra
notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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tial economic stake.78 It may also function as a means for the
Court to evaluate independently the economic criteria the
Commission has refuted. The attention paid by the Court to
COFAZ's evidence of economic injury demonstrates a willingness to second-guess the Commission's exercise of discretion. 79 This occurs despite the Court's disclaimers to the contrary.8 °
B. Expansion of the "Direct and Individual Concern" Test
The Court has shown itself willing to construe liberally the
tests for direct and individual concern articulated in the Toepfer
and Plaumann judgments. 8 1 A review of recent cases in which

the Court granted standing reveals that it does not always distinguish between direct and individual concern elements, but
simply considers the facts in the aggregate to meet the requirements for admissibility.82 In COFAZ, the Court did not mention the Toepfer direct concern requirement that the decision
78. The Court makes plain in both COFAZ and Timex that the complainants have
adduced substantial evidence of adverse economic effects caused by implementation
of the contested measures. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
79. The criteria established in FEDIOL, see supra note 72, appear to allow a broad
base from which complainants might attack a Commission decision. See Temple
Lang, Judicial Review of Trade Safeguard Measures in the European Community, in 1985
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 641, 670 (B. Hawk ed. 1986).

80. While the Court in COFAZ states that "[it is not for the Court ofJustice, at
this stage of the procedure, when it is considering whether the application is admissible, to make a definitive finding on the competitive relationship between the applicants and the Netherlands undertakings," the Court's decision to find the complaint
admissible relies substantially on just such an evaluation of the economic criteria.
COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at - (para. 28 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,284, at 16,763. See also FEDIOL v. Commission, Case 191/82, 1983 E.C.R. 2913,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,013. Regarding its decision to allow admissibility to
challenge a Commission decision refusing to initiate an anti-subsidy procedure, the
Court stated that it "is required to exercise its normal powers of review over a discretion granted to a public authority, even though it has no jurisdiction to intervene in
the exercise of the discretion reserved to the Community authorities by the aforementioned regulation." Id. at 2935-36, para. 30, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,013,
at 14,173.
81. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g.,
Timex Corp. v. Council & Commission, Case 264/82, 1985 E.C.R.
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,143; Demo-Studio Schmidt v. Commission, Case
210/81, 1983 E.C.R. 3045, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,009. In FEDIOL, the
Court does not in fact mention the tests, rather it invokes the "spirit of the principles
which lie behind Articles 164 and 173" to find complainants deserving of judicial
review. FEDIOL, 1983 E.C.R. at 2935, para. 29, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,013,
at 14,173.
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come into effect immediately to deny the applicant an existing
legal right.8 3 Rather, the Court concluded that it was enough
that there existed a connection between the subject matter of
the contested decision and the complaint at the origin of that
decision.8 4
In the Plaumann judgment, the complainant importers

were denied admissibility because they were merely members
of a class of importers of particular merchandise. In COFAZ,
there was no attempt by the complainants to distinguish themselves from other Community producers of nitrate fertilizers. 85
Nor is there any indication that the Court considered whether
the complainants suffered individuated harm or if it examined
only general conditions in the French market. 86 Hence, the
Court's assessment of standards of admissibility shows a
marked liberalization since the Plaumannjudgment.
The Court has also accorded greater significance to the
activism displayed by individuals in attempting to protect their
rights under Community law. The Plaumann test acknowledged that persons may be individually concerned where the
contested decision affects them by reason of their attributes.8 7
In Metro I, the Court noted that the applicant's complaint led
to the adoption of the decision being challenged under Article
173(2).88 The Timex judgment stressed that the applicant's
83. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
84. The Court stated "it is sufficient to observe that the decision has left intact
all the effects of the tariff system set up, whilst the procedure sought by the applicants
would lead to the adoption of a decision to abolish or amend that system." COFAZ,
1986 E.C.R. at - (para. 30 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,284, at
16,764. See also Metro SB-Grossm~irkte GmbH & Co. K.G. v. Commission (Metro II),
Case 75/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [ 14,326, where the Court
similarly found admissible a complaint that directly addressed the subject matter of a
contested decision and where the decision maintained a distribution system, the specific features of which were criticized by complainant during an administrative procedure under Regulation 17. Id. at -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,326, at 17,033.
85. See COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at - (paras. 17-18 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,284, at 16,762. Cf. Societi "Eridania" Zuccherifici Nazionali v.
Commission, 1969 E.C.R. 459, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8099 (stating that the
mere fact that a Community measure may influence the competitive relationships
existing on the market in question cannot suffice to allow any enterprise thereby affected to be regarded as directly and individually concerned).
86. See COFAZ, 1986 E.C.R. at - (paras. 26-27 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,284, at 16,763.
87. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
88. See Metro SB-Grossmiirkte GmbH & Co. K.G. v. Commission (Metro I), Case
26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, para. 13, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 7848.
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views were heard during the procedure and their observations

largely determined the conduct of the investigation.8 9 It is

clear that the Court will consider new criteria 90 in its admissibility judgments,9 criteria that reflect both respect for individuals' rights and Community policy toward enforcement of the
State aid rules.
C. Community Policy and the Effect of COFAZ

The Commission's stated policy of vigorous enforcement
of the State aids provisions of the Treaty is of vital importance
to the future of the Community. 92 Incompatible State aids distort competition, raise trade barriers, and produce unemployment and overcapacity in the industries of the Member
States.93 Individual competitors and citizens therefore have a
substantial interest in protecting themselves from the adverse
effects caused by such aid.94 Recent procedural changes have
shown that the Commission is eager to assist individuals affected by State aids and to encourage their intervention in Article 93(2) procedures.9" COFAZ may well have been a benefi89. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
90. Although the Court is now willing to consider a broad range of admissibility
criteria, it is also apparent that the Toepfer and Plaumann tests are still viable. See
Piraiki-Patraiki Cotton Indus. A.E. v. Commission, Case 11/82, 1985 E.C.R. -,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,159. The Court found admissible a complaint by
Greek cotton exporters against French quotas on imports of cotton. The Court utilized the Toepfer test to find that any discretion on the part of the French government
in implementing the quotas was illusory and so the quotas could be considered to
come into effect immediately upon Community permission. Id. at - (paras. 8-10 of
the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,159, at 15,934-35. By using the
Plaumann test the Court determined that the exporters with executory contracts with
French customers were individually distinguished as a limited class of traders identifiable to the Commission. Id. at - (paras. 30-32 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,159, at 15,937.
91. One commentator has suggested that the focus of the Court on the existence of procedural rights in cases such as FEDIOL may signal that those rulings were
"based more on the legislation than on Article 173." See Temple Lang, supra note 79,
at 663. This could mean that the liberalized standing test would not be applicable in
cases not involving competition-related Treaty provisions. See id.
92. See Brussels Rift over Enforcing Competition, Financial Times, Oct. 7, 1986, at 1,
col. 3; Comm'n, Eleventh Report on Competition Policy 177 (1981).
93. See 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 4, at 92.05.-.07.

94. Community competitors pay the price of State aids in the form of lost market share, unfair competition, and unemployment caused by distortions in intraCommunity competition and internal barriers to trade; taxpayers are saddled with
the burden of financing the aid. See Caspari, supra note 6, at 3.
95. The Commission has instituted a policy of sending copies of all final deci-
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ciary of this more open climate. It would be unfortunate if the
effect of the COFAZ judgment were to make the Commission
wary of conferring with or acting on complaints by individuals
out of fear their decisions will later be challenged before the
Court. The Commission's resolve in enforcing the Treaty and
limiting the use of State aids,9 6 however, should prevail over

any such concerns.
The COFAZ judgment could possibly have the effect of
overwhelming the Commission with complaints and the Court
with challenges to Commission decisions. However, in both
COFAZ and Timex, 9 7 the Court required very significant evidence of the potential for economic injury resulting from implementation of the contested decisions. This test alone will
discourage ill-founded complaints.
The procedural rules of Article 93 also guard against possible untoward effects stemming from COFAZ. 9 8 As noted
above, applicants may not claim standing simply by intervening in an Article 93(2) procedure already in progress.9 9 Additionally, frivolous complaints will be limited because only nonnotified, and therefore illegal, aid systems are subject to review
initiated by an applicant such as COFAZ. This is because any
Article 93(2) procedure opened to evaluate a notified aid system will perforce be initiated by the Commission itself. This
sions to all interested third parties who intervene in an Article 93(2) procedure. To
encourage intervention, the Commission will now provide more information on such
procedures and more detail where a State modifies its original aid proposal than it
did previously. See Comm'n, Fifteenth Report on Competition Policy 171 (1985).
96. See id.

97. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
98. One such effect might be to undermine the security of recipients of State
aids by subjecting the aid to subsequent challenge. This possibility would be minimized, however, by the COFAZ requirement that the applicant be at the origin of the
Article 93(2) procedure. This means that only unnotified grants or alterations of
State aids would be within the ambit of COFAZ, since notified aid will be subject to
investigation procedures begun by the Commission itself. In these cases, the aid in
question would be either illegal, because unnotified, or incompatible, because of
changes in the aid or in the environment of the Community. In either instance, the
aid in question would be liable to application of the Treaty provisions under Articles
92 and 93. If the aid is ultimately found compatible by the Commission, recipients
are not harmed; if the aid is found incompatible, the COFAZ judgment will have
assisted in enforcing the State aids rules. This situation emphasizes how important it
is that potential recipients of grants enquire as to whether the issuing Member State
has cleared the proposed aid scheme with the Community. See FitzGerald, supra note
12, app. 2-2, at App. 2-2-5-6.
99. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
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result nullifies the possibility that the applicant is at the origin
of the decision.
CONCLUSION
The COFAZ decision is a positive step toward liberalizing
the standard for admissibility,100 and therefore expanding the
potential for judicial review of Community acts that have a definite impact on the lives and livelihoods of individuals within
the Common Market.' 0 ' COFAZ is also laudable because of the
harmful nature of subsidization in the environment of the European Community.' 0 2 Vigilance by competitors and the possibility of sanctions may prove a strong deterrent to States considering the grant of incompatible or unnotified aids. Incompatible aid granted even for short periods can have serious
effects on competitive relationships in inter-Community markets.' 0 3 By recognizing and strengthening individual rights
concerning State aids, the Court further binds together the interests of all the citizens of the European Community.
PeterJ. Allen*
100. It has been suggested that the liberalization of the standard for admissibility may be limited to competition-related causes of action (antitrust, antidumping,
and State aids). See Competition Cases before the EC Court of Justice: Panel Discussion, in
1986 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. ch. 20 (B. Hawk ed. 1987) (comments of Messrs. Eric

Stein and Pierre Pescatore).
101. See Caspari, supra note 6, at 3-4.
102. See FitzGerald, supra note 12, app. 2-2, at App. 2-2-1.
103. See Flynn, State Aid and Self-help, 8 EUR. L. REV. 297, 299, 308 (1983).
* J.D. Candidate, 1989, Fordham University School of Law.

